

by John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
The defeat of the Russian army in war discredits, not the soldiers who fought and died, but the commander-in-chief and the generals who were in command. Defeat on the battlefield also destroys Russian military honour as a political force in the country, just as its opposite, victory on the battlefield, threatens the civilian commander-in-chief with his replacement by a soldier hero.
To protect himself from his triumphant, and also from his disgruntled officers, the commander-in-chief may make his generals scapegoats for the defeat. Joseph Stalin had begun shooting scapegoat officers before the German invasion of June 21, 1941, and then accelerated his purge in the weeks which followed. In 1946, in the aftermath of the Red Army’s victory over Germany, Stalin neutralized Marshal Georgiy Zhukov (for the second time), stripping him of his command powers and sending him into internal exile, all for purely political reasons. Stalin had allowed Zhukov to lead the victory parade in Red Square but only after Stalin had tried himself and failed to stay in the saddle of the white horse. Stalin’s jealousy of Zhukov’s domestic popularity was compounded by his (not unreasonable) fear of a military putsch and of the Caligula Cure.
For most Russians – and this has been a consistent finding of public opinion polling by the independent Levada Centre of Moscow – the President’s popularity, public trust, and approval of his performance run about 10 points ahead of the Russian trust in the Army. However, the two support each other on the upswing in the polls when there are victories to celebrate; and then on the downswing when there are defeats, rising casualties, and war fatigue across the countryside. Between 2022 and now, for example, Russian approval of Putin has risen to the 80% level; for the Army approval has also risen to about 70%.
It is the conclusion of the Kremlin and of the General Staff, therefore, that they should either hang together or if not, they will hang each other.
Having opposed but obeyed Putin’s orders forbidding them to fire on Israeli aircraft attacking Syria, or on Turkish ground operations in and around Idlib, Moscow sources believe the General Staff have now told Putin much more than the refrain, he’s heard many times before, “We told you so”. This time the General Staff assessment of the invasion of Syria, refusal of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to fight, and the replacement of the Assad regime in Damascus is that grave damage has been done to the protective alliances which Russia has been promoting in Africa, the Americas, China, and North Korea.
“We just have to accept that Iran and Russia have been comprehensively defeated in their non-fight, “a well-informed Moscow source says. “It is the worst defeat of Russia by the Turks in history. If Putin goes on now to make significant concessions in an Istanbul II negotiation with [President Donald] Trump, that will be the cherry on top of the Turkish halva. We are thinking this; no one is saying it. In the end, a defeat in Ukraine is all we care about. If Putin fails to deliver that, then he has a much bigger problem than the one he has just retreated from. Yes, this is a huge dishonour for us, but nothing is served by talking of it. Still, the situation can be redeemed in the Ukraine. This means the complete and comprehensive defeat of the enemy there.”
A non-Russian military source says the Russians he knows are “in denial. The Turks can now say we have them where we want them. This means the Israelis and the Americans can say the same. That means leverage above and beyond the Levant, in Africa, Asia and no less in Ukraine. What do the Russians have to offer their African or Asian friends now? Do they say — we’ll be there for you, of course, until the end – we mean your end. Of course, when the going gets tough, and potentially that means fighting the Americans or one of its proxy armies, the Russians now show they will blame their unwillingness to fight on their friends’ refusal to do what the Russians advise; their military incompetence; their corruption; or their racial inferiority compared to Russians.”
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