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by John Helmer, Moscow
  @bears_with

At the beginning of this month, Bild, the German media sensationalist, claimed to have discovered “incredible developments between [Presidents] Trump and Putin. And they affect Germany! Bild research reveals secret talks between the US and Russia in Switzerland. It’s about an explosive gas deal for Germany! At the centre of the affair: once again the Baltic Sea pipeline Nord Stream 2.”  

The Bild story alleged that Trump’s envoy for special missions, Richard Grenell, made several visits for negotiations at the headquarters of Nord Stream 2 AG — the Baltic seabed pipeline’s operator, wholly owned by Russia’s sanctioned Gazprom — in Steinhausen, in the Swiss canton of Zug.  Grenell has denied the story.  

The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, added there was no point in his commenting on Bild’s  claims because Grenell “has already denied it. And so the Americans have denied it. Also, there is a lot of information [in the Bild publication] that is not true.”  

The Bild report followed just hours after a report appeared in London by the Financial Times  maintaining that “a former spy and close friend of Vladimir Putin has been engineering a restart of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Europe with the backing of US investors, a once unthinkable move that shows the breadth of Donald Trump’s rapprochement with Moscow. The efforts on a deal, according to several people aware of the discussions, were the brainchild of Matthias Warnig, an ex-Stasi officer in East Germany who until 2023 ran Nord Stream 2’s parent company for the Kremlin-controlled gas giant Gazprom.”  

The anonymous sources told the newspaper “Warnig’s plan involved outreach to the Trump team through US businessmen as part of back-channel efforts to broker an end to the war in Ukraine while deepening economic ties between the US and Russia. Some prominent Trump administration figures are aware of the initiative to bring in US investors, according to officials in Washington, and they see it as part of the push to rebuild relations with Moscow.”

Warnig told the FT he was “not involved in any discussions with any American politicians or business representatives.”

Stephen Lynch, a well-known arbitrageur between Russian and US asset buyers and sellers following the Yukos oil company’s  nationalization between 2004 and 2007, was reportedly behind some of the fresh media leaks, according to which “one US-led consortium of investors has drawn up the outlines of a post-sanctions deal with Gazprom, according to one person with direct knowledge of talks who declined to disclose the identity of the prospective investors.”   For Lynch’s record, including his attempt at a hostile takeover of gas assets of Ukrainian oligarch Dmitry Firtash in 2016, click to read the archive.  

While Lynch has been promoting a Nord Stream takeover for his own commercial reasons, the planting of the story in Bild and the FT may have been an attempt by European officials to kill it.

“Senior EU officials,” according to the London newspaper, “became aware of the Nord Stream 2 discussion in recent weeks. Leaders of several European countries are concerned and have discussed the matter, according to several officials with knowledge of the discussions…The latest plan would in theory give the US unparalleled sway over energy supplies to Europe, the people said, after EU countries moved to end their dependence on Russian gas in the aftermath of the invasion.”  

Russian analysis of these purported dealmakers and their targets has been compiled in this new piece, published on March 18 by the Moscow business weekly, Expert. In its assessment of the German and British claims, Expert concludes   that American speculators are being attracted to the potential profit in schemes for buying low-priced Russian assets currently under sanctions; lobbying the  Trump Administration to lift the sanctions as part of an end-of-war settlement in the Ukraine; and then reselling the assets if and when business with Russia revives and the Russian asset prices return to pre-war market levels.  Lobbying the Trump Administration is the polite term for this.

According to Expert, a scheme to dismantle the current sanctions and refill the single,  undamaged pipe of Nord Stream 2 with Gazprom gas for Germany is between improbable and impossible. However, an alternative with better chances for speculators is a buyout of Rosneft’s German oil refinery at Schwedt.

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by John Helmer, Moscow
  @bears_with

President Vladimir Putin has solved the problem of how to conduct telephone calls with Donald Trump’s personality cult.

Following Trump’s tweeted claim in the early morning of Tuesday that “many elements of a Final Agreement have been agreed to”  the telephone call which took place over two hours  of the early Moscow evening,   ended without agreement on any “final” point.

Trump has remained uncharacteristically silent. The only tweet he has issued since the call with Putin has been an attack on a “Radical Left Lunatic of a Judge, a troublemaker and agitator who was sadly appointed by Barack Hussein Obama”.  

The US media have remained in the dark, while detailed results have been compiled and published by the Russian media. According to these sources, Putin agreed to the creation of “expert groups” to work on the military, political, and economic end-of-war settlement.  This is a signal that the efforts by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron to continue the war on their terms will be excluded, and that the Russian military advance westward will continue on all salients. Russian targeting of British, French and US military units on the battlefield, at Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, and Kharkov and at staff bunkers in western Ukraine will continue.  

In response to Trump’s demand for a 30-day ceasefire – the Anglo-American proposal which was announced with Ukrainian officials in Jeddah on March 11 – Putin said no. Instead, he agreed to suspend the Russian electric war campaign, and for thirty days halt strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure on condition that  Trump will reciprocate with a stop to Ukrainian drone and missile attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

No agreement was reached on Trump’s attempt to save the encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk. Instead, Putin agreed that Ukrainians who surrender on the battlefield will not be shot. Putin also offered an exchange of prisoners of war, 175 to 175; and the return from Russian hospitals of 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers.

Although the discussion by the presidents touched on naval operations on the Black Sea, including targeting flights by US drones and NATO fixed-wing aircraft, no agreement was reached.

The assessment in Moscow is that Putin has turned a battlefield restriction he has already imposed on the General Staff into a concession he now requires Trump to enforce on the Zelensky regime. The ball, as US officials have insisted they have put in Moscow’s court, has been played back into Washington’s court.

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by John Helmer, Moscow
  @bears_with

NATO infantry operations veteran Major (retd) Mark Takacs (lead image) has published an  animated map analysis of the battles between Russian and Ukrainian forces around Sudzha, in the Kursk region, between March 5 and 14. Nothing comparable has been reported by the Russian military bloggers; their US copyists; or the Ukrainian and British propaganda agencies.

Without the intention on Takacs’ part, his military analysis reveals the reason for the announcement of the “immediate, interim 30-day ceasefire”  on March 11 in Jeddah by the US and Ukrainian delegations, after the plan had been composed by UK and US officials in Kiev over the previous weekend.  This is to restore command and control communications with the Ukrainian units still occupying about 20% of the Kursk territory they had taken last August; restore and refill the primary NO7 highway and secondary routes into the Kursk salient for supplies of fresh arms, ammunition and troops; and construct new defence lines and fortifications which had either failed or been missing during the Russian offensive movements of the previous week.

A parallel plan for the salients southward down the line of contact is likely, although Takacs has yet to analyse them. In short, the ceasefire has been proposed to continue the war, not to end it.

“The control of Ukrainian troops inside this incursion zone [Kursk] has been lost,” President Vladimir Putin said on March 13.  “At the initial stages, just a week or two ago, Ukrainian servicemen tried to get out of there in small groups. Now it is impossible. They are trying to get out in very small groups of two or three men because everything is under our complete fire control…If this area is physically blocked in the next few days, then no one will be able to leave. There will only be two options: surrender or die. I think in these conditions it would be good for the Ukrainian side to achieve a ceasefire for at least 30 days. We are also in favour of it, but there are nuances. What are they?”

“First, what will we do about the incursion section in the Kursk Region? What would that mean if we cease fire for 30 days? Does this mean that everyone who is in there will just walk out without a fight? Do we have to let them go after they committed numerous heinous crimes against civilians? Or will the Ukrainian leadership issue a command for them to lay down their arms and just surrender? How will this happen? It is not clear.”  

In his week-long record of the Kursk battlefield, Takacs corroborates Putin’s description that the Ukrainian forces have been cut off by successful Russian military operations. But Takacs indicates that despite the disruption of their communications and their supply routes, they have been able to hold on to their positions despite Russian air superiority,  drone and artillery fire control,  and a five to one numerical superiority of infantrymen.

Takacs also reveals he has found no evidence that the Ukrainian operations were adversely affected by the Washington press release announcing the “pause” in US intelligence sharing with the Ukrainian forces starting on March 5, and ending with the press release of resumption on March 11.

Earlier, on March 4, Takacs reported he was taking the pause seriously: “Much of the minute-accurate tactical intelligence data (0-20/30 km deep behind the enemy’s perimeter) comes from US technical intelligence sources. Of course, the Ukrainians also operate tactical reconnaissance systems, but mainly they cannot see into the areas behind the Russian brigades and beyond to the depth of the division without the Americans. This is a problem because Russian operations can be predicted by 12-36 hours (so even the often mentioned shift-of-gravity attack method can be avoided) if there is accurate information about these terrain sections. If this is not the case, then the Ukrainian defence will be at a significant disadvantage.”  

His subsequent assessment records no US pause, no Ukrainian disadvantage.

Another NATO campaign veteran comments on Takacs’s report: “There’s no mention of the supposed American support cut-off as a contributory factor in the Ukrainian defeat. Instead, we can see that on the Russian side, superior electronic warfare, persistent and patient preparation over several months, tactical surprise, and bravery (the Pipe Operation), and Ukrainian negligence are given credit for the Russian victory.”

The Takacs report also raises a question which Russian analysts and their American copyists have been reluctant to ask: why, with overwhelming air, ground and firepower superiority against the Ukrainians, and the months-long preparation of the operational plans, has the Russian offensive been so slow?

Watch the 20-minute Takacs video by clicking here.  

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by Jean-Marc Bovy, Geneva
  @bears_with

Do you remember Sergei Skripal, that double agent poisoned in Great Britain, they said, by the Russian secret services? What has become of them, Sergei and his daughter Yulia, since they survived one of the most violent poisons that there are?  Why don’t we see them any longer? And there are other troublesome questions which only a great adventurer of investigating in troubled waters could tackle.

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by John Helmer, Moscow 
  @bears_with

In this discussion on Thursday morning, Chennai time, two leading Indian military analysts, Lieutenant General (retd) Ravi Shankar and Brigadier (retd) Arun Saghal,  explain that the 30-day ceasefire which the Americans and British have proposed for the Ukraine battlefield should follow as one of the outcomes of the  end-of-war negotiations, and not be a precondition for talks.  

Otherwise, the ceasefire proposal is nothing more than a smoke barrage to cover US and NATO reinforcement and resupply of the Ukrainian forces which are now surrounded or in retreat.

Click to listen to the hour-long podcast.

Several hours later in the Moscow afternoon, President Vladimir Putin confirmed the Russian order is negotiations before ceasefire. Putin proposed that President Donald Trump telephone him to get the details directly from the horse’s mouth.

“On Ukraine’s readiness to cease the hostilities” — Putin said this is an American scheme to relieve the Ukrainian forces before they are routed and capitulate.  “The US-Ukraine meeting in Saudi Arabia [March 11] may look like the Ukrainian side made this decision under pressure from the United States.” Without agreement on military terms, it was a deception, Putin went on. “What will we do about the incursion section in the Kursk Region? What would that mean if we cease fire for 30 days? Does this mean that everyone who is in there will just walk out without a fight? Do we have to let them go after they committed numerous heinous crimes against civilians? Or will the Ukrainian leadership issue a command for them to lay down their arms and just surrender? How will this happen? It is not clear.”

“How will other issues along the entire contact line be solved? It is almost 2,000 kilometres long. As you know, Russian troops are advancing in almost all areas of combat contact. Conditions are also very favourable there for us to block rather large units there. So, how would these 30 days be used? For forced mobilisation to continue in Ukraine? For more weapons to be supplied there? For retraining the mobilised units? Or would none of this be done?”  

“All these issues must be meticulously worked upon by both sides. The idea itself is right, and, of course, we support it. However, there are issues that must be discussed. I think we must talk them over with our American colleagues and partners, perhaps have a telephone conversation with President Trump and discuss them with him. However, the idea to put an end to this conflict by peaceful means gets our full support.”

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by John Helmer, Moscow 
  @bears_with

 “As for the situation in Syria,”, the spokesman for President Vladimir Putin announced on Monday, “violence is taking place there, which cannot but cause our deep concern. This concern is shared in many countries of the world, in international organizations, including the United Nations.”  On Tuesday, he added that “Russia supports the stabilization of Syria because of the need to maintain the security of the entire region…Syria is now too explosive a region, which may affect other countries. That is why Russia wants to see Syria prosperous, predictable, and friendly.”

This was stating the obvious. The Kremlin was also not stating a Russian policy.

The Russian Foreign Ministry tried to say more than the obvious. In its statement of March 7,  the Ministry explained that “alarmed by the sharp aggravation of the situation in Syria…we call on all authoritative Syrian leaders who can influence the further development of the situation on the ground to do everything possible to end the bloodshed and prevent civilian casualties as soon as possible…We reaffirm our principled position in support of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. We hope that all states that have an impact on the situation in Syria will contribute to its normalization. We are committed to close coordination with foreign partners in the interests of the speedy de-escalation of the situation.”  

As a policy, this was ambiguous on whether Russia recognizes Ahmed Al-Sharaa as president of the government which has replaced Bashir al-Assad by force. The Ministry term, “authoritative Syrian leaders”, avoids the problem of what the new president’s real name is, since it is suspected that al-Sharaa is not his real family name, nor is it Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, which is a nom de guerre.

The Ministry term is also a plural one, intimating that now, soon or later, Russian policy will recognize other Syrian leaders. These may include Qadri Jamil, a Syrian Kurd, educated in Moscow whose proto-communist political party has been backed by the Russians for more than a decade.  This week Jamil was the first Syrian political leader to be received officialy at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow.  The communiqué issued by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov indicated Russian support for the Syrian Kurds based primarily in the northeast.

“A discussion was held,” Bogdanov said, “on the development of the situation in Syria, including the tragic events that occurred in the coastal areas of the country. At the same time, special emphasis was placed on the need to establish an inclusive political process with the participation of representatives of all ethno-confessional groups on the basis of initiatives of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 in the interests of ensuring the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic. In this context, the importance of the agreement signed on March 10 in Damascus between the President of the transition period of Syria A.Sharaa and the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces M. Abdi was noted.”  

This is a reference to Mazloum Abdi (aka Mazloum Kobane) who has been the head of the Kurdish military forces, and who met with Al-Sharaa in Damascus on March 10; reportedly, they agreed on terms for Kurdish administrative autonomy.  Jamil met Bogdanov to brief him the next day. Earlier in Damascus, on January 28, Bogdanov had met with al-Sharaa. The boilerplate of his communiqué indicated that al-Sharaa did not agree to “formalising pertinent arrangements” for the future of the Russian bases at Khmeimim and Tartus, but that the two sides would keep negotiating.

There is no public record that Bogdanov has met with other Syrians between al-Sharaa at the end of January and Jamil this week, following the start of the rebellion. There is also no record of who gave the orders for the opening of the Khmeimim base to the Alawite refugees over the weekend.

For what is happening at the bases in Syria, and Russian policymaking in Syria, listen to the 45-minute discussion with Chris Cook by clicking here:

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by John Helmer, Moscow 
  @bears_with

There are four outcomes to beware in this game for players, and for kibitzers also.

The first is the Observer Effect. This is when the observer gets so close to the target, the target itself is rattled, loses visibility, acts unpredictably. Second is the Confusion Effect when the observer can’t tell the difference between the confusion observed externally, and the confusion occurring internally, between objective chaos and subjective incomprehension. Third is the Echo Chamber Effect which occurs when subordinates repeat what their leader says and dare say no more in case the leader changes his mind and they lose favour.

Finally, there is the Monica Lewinsky Effect.  This is a particularity of the Oval Office of the US President. It happens to his subordinates and officials of allied governments when, no matter how much they doubt what the President is saying from above his desk, they must go under his desk to ingratiate his ego and swallow their doubt without gagging.   

Listen to the hour-long discussion with Nima Alkhorshid and Ray McGovern analyzing the results of the Jeddah meeting between US and Ukrainian officials, and forecasting what the Russian response will be. Click to view here.  

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by John Helmer, Moscow 
  @bears_with

Last week I asked Lieutenant General (retired) P.R. Shankar to analyse India’s victorious war against Pakistan which in fourteen days, December 3-16, 1971, ended in the capitulation of the Pakistan Army and the creation of the new state of Bangladesh; and compare that with Russia’s Special Military Operation (SVO) against the Ukraine which began on February 24, 2022, and is continuing after 1,110 days.  

The questions were: what lessons do you and Indian military and political analysts today draw from your victory in the war of 1971 which the Russians should apply to the Ukraine: intelligence; plans and readiness; the speed of operations; firepower and troop ratios; problems of coordination between military control and political command?   Also, what lessons do you draw from the involvement of the Americans on the other side forcing end-of-war terms in exchange for money. 

Listen to the podcast just published here.  

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by John Helmer, Moscow 
  @bears_with

President Donald Trump has asked President Vladimir Putin to assist him in arranging a grand Middle East peace deal. This, according to officials leaking to Bloomberg reporters, requires Iran to agree to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, and also “Iran’s support for its allied groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah in the Middle East.”  

The leakers, “people with knowledge of the situation, asking not to be identified”, according to Bloomberg,   reportedly did not ask Putin to mediate the restoration of the Pahlavi monarchy.  

The news agency story follows by three weeks the White House announcement on February 4 of “a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) restoring maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon, and countering Iran’s malign influence abroad. The NSPM establishes that: Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles; Iran’s terrorist network should be neutralized; and Iran’s aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered. The NSPM directs the Secretary of the Treasury to impose maximum economic pressure on the Government of Iran, including by sanctioning or imposing enforcement mechanisms on those acting in violation of existing sanctions.”  

The US officials briefing Bloomberg claim that after his big stick move, Trump made two small carrot moves in the direction of the Russians. On February 12, Trump told Putin on the telephone that he had a deal to end the war in the Ukraine if Putin would help with a deal to end Iran’s war in the Middle East. 

Trump then told Secretary of State Marco Rubio to say more when he met in Riyadh with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on February 18. Whatever the Americans say they said, Lavrov omitted to mention it in the communiqué and press briefing in Riyadh.  

During his subsequent meetings in Teheran on February 25, Lavrov was explicit – almost — in opposing Trump’s stick-wielding. “We underscored the inadmissibility of unilateral economic sanctions,” Lavrov announced after meetings with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.  “We will continue substantive and focused efforts to mitigate the adverse effects of these unlawful restrictions on the economies of Russia and Iran…We have discussed at length the developments around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We remain convinced that the diplomatic resource is still there and should not be left unused. Instead, it should be engaged as effectively as possible and no threats or allusions to forceful solutions should be made. We are committed to continuing the search for acceptable solutions to the situation at hand which was created by our Western colleagues, not Iran.”  

Since the refusal of Kremlin support for Iran’s military alliance with Bashar al-Assad’s government in Damascus last November and December, the subsequent recriminations between Teheran and Moscow have not been entirely or clearly resolved. For the record of the recriminations, click; for the attempt to resolve them in the January treaty signing, read this; for the continuing irresolution,  look again.  

On Friday, March 7, Trump said he believes Putin will do more for Trump’s Ukraine “deal” than the Kremlin is admitting publicly. “I think he’s going to be more generous than he has to be, and that’s pretty good.”  Is this true? Is it an American attempt to sow suspicion and distrust in Moscow between the General Staff and the Kremlin? Is it also aimed at splitting the Iranians from the Russians? 

Lavrov’s announcement after his meeting with President Pezeshkian was non-committal on the concessions Trump wants from Iran for denuclearization and withdrawal of support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansar Allah (Houthis). “During the exchange of views on pressing global and regional issues, the focus was placed on the evolving situations in Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone, and matters pertaining to the Caspian region. The sides coordinated their positions regarding the state of affairs surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme,” the Russian communiqué announced after Lavrov met with Pezeshkian.   

 “Coordination” is a camouflage term in the current Russian-Iranian relationship. It appears 71 times in the January pact Pezeshkian signed in Moscow with Putin. Its meaning, Russian sources believe, carries outer ambiguity, inner secrecy – also uncertainty under the pressure Trump is applying. 

A Russian source in a position to know believes the strategic consensus in Moscow, and also at the Ukraine front, is that “the empire [US] won’t stop its war with Russia. But we need time to correct the tactical mistakes that have been made. Trump’s peace is going to be short-lived. Maybe five years, maybe eight. There’s no point fighting him at every step. We’ll try to get the best deal possible that leaves him thinking he looks good. After losing eight years, Russia wants to gain eight years.”

A military source comments that in the short run the more confusion Trump and his officials create, the more time the Russian General Staff has to accelerate the military offensive westward from the current line of contact towards Kiev.  “The American learning disability is showing across the board,” he says. “The kettle is now on the boil in Sumy. The Ukrainians are cut off in Kursk and don’t have much more time left. East of the Dnieper, it’s apparent that Putin’s foot is off the brake.”

The US side is now calling time. National Security Advisor Michael Waltz has announced that he, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Steven Witkoff will return for negotiations with their Russian counterparts in Riyadh next week. The Kiev regime has announced they will be meeting the US delegation on Tuesday.

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by John Helmer, Moscow 
  @bears_with

Someone has convinced President Donald Trump of two simple ideas. 

The first is that because the US auto, aerospace, and artificial intelligence industries are heavily  dependent for their supplies of lithium, titanium,  and other rare earth minerals (REM) on two enemy states, China and Russia, they should be replaced as quickly as possible by a friendly source.  

The second idea is that, in order to break this dependency, the cheapest solution is to take over the Ukrainian sources of these minerals and metals at zero cost of acquisition — zero cost because the Ukraine can be pressed to hand over its sources as payback for the US financing of the war against Russia.

The someone who convinced Trump of these two ideas was Elon Musk (lead image).

His Tesla company is the largest consumer of lithium and producer of lithium batteries for electric vehicles in the US, with his annual tonnage exceeding the four next largest producers combined.   Musk also is a large consumer of titanium, both for Tesla cars and for his SpaceX company’s rockets.   

Also, in Musk’s plans for cornering the artificial intelligence (AI) market with his xAI company, rare earth metals (REM) are essential. In fact, these metals are not rare – it’s just that they exist in low concentrations which are difficult and expensive to extract. They are crucial components of the semiconductors which provide the computing power that drives AI. They possess uniquely powerful magnetic qualities and are excellent at conducting electricity and resisting heat.  

The problem with these ideas is that China will not give up any of its resources to its US enemy,  especially not in the conditions of trade war which Trump is threatening. Too, Russia is in kinetic war with the US on the Ukrainian battlefield, and will not allow either the US directly, or the regime it supports in Kiev, to obtain the REM.

The solution Musk and Trump have come up with is a proposal to stop insulting President Vladimir Putin in public and start negotiating terms for an end of war beginning with a scheme for taking the Ukrainian REM from Kiev as payback for the $350 billion Trump says the US has spent in the Ukraine since the war began. 

The number is false; the idea of peace with Russia on these terms is a hustle.  

Russia currently controls much of the Ukraine’s titanium, lithium, and REM, and the remainder of its mineable reserves are within easy shooting range. Russia’s own titanium, lithium, and REM reserves are much greater, but they are controlled for strategic reasons by state companies. No foreign investor would be allowed under Russia’s strategic minerals law — except to buy the offtake at the market price.

The Musk-Trump plan for peace with Russia and REM war with China, at zero cost to Musk, is a no-brainer. That’s to say, a scheme for simpletons. 

However, as an international investor who knows both Moscow and Washington well points out, “there’s no shortage of American investors giving Musk billions to invest in colonizing the moon and then Mars. Why wouldn’t they invest in Ukraine? Musk has convinced Trump he should and they will .”

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