

By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
In the pre-dawn hours of March 4, the Iranian frigate, Islamic Republic of Iran Ship (IRIS) Dena, was racing eastward on the Indian Ocean. From the southwest, a tailwind of 7 knots and swell of 1.5 metres added to the Mowj-class vessel’s top speed of 30 knots. At coordinates 6.0073 degrees North , 79.8654 degrees East, the Dena was 9 nautical miles (nm) outside Sri Lanka’s territorial waters; 19 nm west of the harbour of Galle, a port on the southwestern coast of the island.
It was 05:06 local time. Dawn was an hour away. On the bridge of the Dena the clock and speed log showed that in just 18 minutes the vessel and its crew would be safe from US pursuit and attack.
That was when a US Navy submarine, the USS Charlotte, fired two torpedoes. One missed; one struck the Dena, holed the aft section, triggered an internal explosion, and sank the ship within three minutes (lead image, top). Of the crew’s 180-man complement, 32 were rescued alive by the Sri Lankan coast guard; 87 bodies were recovered from the water; 61 were lost. Altogether, 148 were killed (lead image, below).
In the Pentagon briefing which followed, Secretary of War Peter Hegseth said: “an American submarine sunk an Iranian warship that thought it was safe in international waters. Instead, it was sunk by a torpedo, quiet death.” Hegseth intended to reveal that the position of the Dena was “in international waters”. He did not mean to reveal the US had been listening to the Dena’s communications as it was transmitting, live. The reason the Dena was reporting it was safe was that it was just 18 minutes from Sri Lankan territorial waters.
The order to catch and kill the Dena had been issued earlier. It required the Charlotte to intercept the course of the Dena before it reached Galle — before it reached Sri Lankan territorial waters. The Charlotte almost missed the interception point and almost missed the target. The Dena almost reached safety.
The reason for both outcomes is that the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, and the Foreign Minister, Subraymanyam Jaishankar, had refused to allow the Dena to enter an Indian port when Jaishankar has acknowledged the request was made on February 28. According to Jaishankar’s statement on March 6, also reported by the BBC on March 9, the safe harbour request was made for the Dena and its two escorts, IRIS Lavan, a landing ship, and IRIS Bushehr, a cadet training and replenishment vessel, According to Jaishankar, only one vessel was allowed sanctuary at Kochi, on India’s west coast; this was the Lavan.
“ ‘The Iranian side had requested permission on 28 February for three ships in the region to dock at our ports. This was accorded on 1 March,’ Jaishankar told parliament on Monday. ‘Iris Lavan actually docked on 4 March in Kochi. The crew is currently in Indian naval facilities. We believe that this was the right thing to do.’”
There has been no Indian explanation and no Indian media reporting of what transpired between February 28 and the morning of March 4, when the Dena was attacked and sunk.
The available evidence suggests that the refusal on Modi’s and Jaishankar’s orders forced the Dena to reverse its course from off the western Indian coast near Kochi and sail southeastwards for more than three days, February 28 to March 3. In that three-day interval, Indian naval intelligence on its position and communications was relayed to the US, on Modi’s direction. The Indians also reported to the Americans the communications they were receiving from the Iranian embassy in New Delhi and from Iranian officials in Teheran. The two senior Indian officials also added to the pressure from the US and also from Israel on the Sri Lankan Government to delay its decision on the Iranian request for sanctuary, all the while lying to Iranian officials in Delhi and Teheran.
These actions make Modi and Jaishankar complicit in the US submarine action; they are culpable as accessories in the murder of the Dena’s crew. This is an Indian war crime.
The crime is compounded by the cover-up or destruction of the evidence , ordered by Modi and his subordinates, of maps, course location data, ship-to-shore communications, and the time sequence from February 25, when the Dena and its escorts, the Lavan and Bushehr, left the east central Indian port of Visakhapatnam, headed for their home port in Iran.
In a press statement on March 5 by the Sri Lankan President, Anura Dissanayake, and a subsequent speech he made to parliament on March 20, it was revealed that on February 26, two days before the war began, Iran requested sanctuary in Sri Lanka for all three Iranian Navy ships.
“A request was made to us,” Dissanayake said, “on 26 February, 2026 for three naval ships to visit Sri Lanka on 9 and 13 March as part of a goodwill visit aimed at strengthening cooperation. We were in the process of reviewing this request for approval. On the same evening, the United States also requested permission for two warfare aircrafts to land at Mattala International Airport in Sri Lanka. We took a clear and firm decision based on our policy of maintaining neutrality. At that time, there were already indications of escalating military tensions. Consequently, we did not grant approval for either of these requests. Some questioned why permission was not granted for the Iranian vessels. Had we done so, it would have compromised our overall neutrality. Furthermore, it would have brought a military conflict, which was distant from our region, closer to Mattala and the Port of Colombo. Regardless of the pressures faced, we acted to safeguard the country and preserve our neutrality. ”
Dissanayake’s admission reveals that the Iranian request for safe harbour preceded by two days the February 28 sanctuary request to India. The Sri Lankan evidence suggests that after the February 26 refusal from Colombo, the Dena sailed on towards Kochi as Iranian officials tried to negotiate with Modi and Jaishankar.
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