

By John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
With these new words (lead image), President Donald Trump has now obliterated – his word for the US attack on Iran on June 22, 2025 – whatever President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have been calling the “understandings” they negotiated at the summit meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 16.
Capitulate or obliterate. That is, and always has been, Trump’s foreign policy for all states, but especially the states capable of defending themselves by effective force – Russia, Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Venezuela, Houthi Yemen, Hamas Palestine, Hezbollah Lebanon, India, China. What Trump has just said of his regime-change offensive against Venezuela applies to all. What stops such a policy is no longer words, especially not the words, “red line”. Only counterforce – and that means, to use Trump’s term, “kill them dead”.
In recent US warmaking history there is precedent. That is the body bag count which, together with the domestic inflation and unemployment rates, ended the Vietnam War – first with the words of the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 (for which Henry Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize), and then with the North Vietnam Army’s and Viet Cong’s force of the US rout from Saigon of 1975 (no prize for Kissinger).
For the time being, the Kremlin insists the “understandings” Putin agreed with Trump in Anchorage continue in effect. “I wish to officially confirm,” declared Foreign Minister Lavrov on Tuesday (October 21), “that Russia has not altered its positions from the understandings achieved during the extensive negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Alaska. These understandings are grounded in the agreements reached at the time, which President Trump succinctly summarised when he stated that what is needed is a long-term, sustainable peace – not an immediate ceasefire that would lead nowhere. We remain fully committed to this formula.”
This “formula” is also promoted by the two strongest allies of the US in the Kremlin – Kirill Dmitriev, the president’s special emissary for wealth transfer to the US; and Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Central Bank. In a misleading tweet, and then in anonymously leaked remarks to CNN in Miami, as he prepared to meet Steven Witkoff on October 25, Dmitriev said: “[I have] arrived in the U.S. to continue the U.S.–Russia dialogue — visit planned a while ago based on an invitation from the U.S. side. Such dialogue is vital for the world and must continue with the full understanding of Russia’s position and respect for its national interests.” He told CNN he was engaged in “official talks just days after President Donald Trump announced tough new sanctions on Russia, sources with knowledge of the visit exclusively told CNN on Friday ’to continue discussions about the US-Russia relationship,’ according to the sources.”
“I think we are reasonably close to a diplomatic solution that can be worked out,” Dmitriev added in what Tass acknowledged was his interview with CNN.
Dmitriev’s promotion of his personal role in direct negotiations with US officials has been repeatedly blocked in Riyadh and then in Anchorage by Lavrov and others.
In her policy announcement on Friday (October 24), following a 50 basis-point cut in the Central Bank’s key rate to 16.5%, Nabiullina acknowledged that her policy is to cut GDP growth in Russia to zero plus statistical error. “Considering its actual dynamics, we have lowered the GDP growth forecast for 2025 to 0.5–1.0%.” What she meant by the “actual dynamics”, Nabiullina explained are the state policies for warfighting against the US and the NATO alliance on the battlefield which she opposes by calling them “pro-inflationary” and “geopolitical” risks: “Significant pro-inflationary risks have materialised since the previous meeting [September 12]. They are primarily associated with an increase in the budget deficit in 2025 and higher fuel prices…The expected increase in taxes will help bring inflation down over the medium-term horizon, but will also lead to a one-off rise in prices in the short term.”
According to Nabiullina, to reduce Russia’s inflation rate, there should be an end to the war on US terms. “Risks to oil prices have increased. The global oil market has shifted to a surplus. This might have a significant impact on prices. For Russia, the situation will be additionally complicated by the sanctions. There is persisting uncertainty related to geopolitics. Everything will depend on how the situation develops.”
The domestic Russian opposition to this policy line is vocal but stops short of accusing Nabiullina and Dmitriev of betraying Russian interests. “Western sanctions are nothing compared to the sanctions of the Central Bank,” State Duma Deputy Mikhail Delyagin, a former Yeltsin government economist and now Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy, said in June. Delyagin’s is the discreet manner of putting the position.
The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, has attempted to deny that the General Staff’s policy – the successful advance of the Russian military on the Ukraine battlefield — is the reason for the high domestic approval of the Army and the President. They are not “correlated”, Peskov said in the Tass headline.
“Russians’ high trust ratings for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the country’s armed forces are separate indicators that are measured separately, Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov has told the media. ‘These are separate indicators that are measured independently. They are indeed very high right now,’ Peskov said, responding to a question about the correlation between the high trust ratings for Putin (77.8% according to VTsIOM) and the Russian Armed Forces (80%).”
Listen to the new podcast on what is about to happen led by Dimitri Lascaris on Reason2Resist, held in Athens on Saturday morning.
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