by John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
In the new podcast with Nima Alkhorshid, here is the breaking news of the sides in the war changing the appearance of their negotiating positions, starting with President Donald Trump and the reply from President Vladimir Putin.
Click to view: https://www.youtube.com/
As you listen, here is the new evidence.
Reporting accurately the policy views of officials, civilian and military, is difficult. Less so, the shift of Russian public opinion behind the Army, the President and other national institutions, such as the Church.
Source: https://www.levada.ru/
Polls of the Russian public generally confirm that they are increasingly optimistic and confident that the direction of the country is positive in general, beneficial for them in particular. In the latest survey by the independent Levada Centre of Moscow, published on April 25 (data gathered between April 17 and 23), it was reported that “the mood of Russians has been improving for the second month in a row: up to the fifth part of the share of respondents who say that they are in a great mood (20%, growth by 8 p.p. from January 2025), the share of those who experience tension, irritation, fear, longing (decrease by 5 percentage points since January 2025) has decreased to 16%), but the majority of respondents are still in a normal, flat state (63%), a decrease of 5 p.p… The normal flat state is often indicated by respondents 55 years and older (67%); Muscovites (73%); those who believe that things in the country are going in the right direction (65%); those who approve of the activities of Vladimir Putin as president (63%); those respondents who say that the financial situation of their family has remained unchanged (69%); as well as those who support the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine (64%).”
The reciprocally reinforcing effects of battlefield success and stable or improving income on support for the Army, the President, and the direction of the country are plain. So is the reverse. “The level of disapproval of V. Putin is higher among the less wealthy respondents (14% among those who are barely enough for food); those who say that the financial situation of their family over the past year has worsened (23%); those who trust YouTube channels as a source of information (28%); those who believe that the country is going in the wrong direction (49%); those who do not support the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine (40%); and those who believe that it is necessary to move to peace now.”
For Russian sociologists tracking public opinion towards the war, the military outcome, negotiating options, and the perception of Russia’s enemies and allies, Denis Volkov (right), director of the Levada Centre, recently concluded that the “mobilization effect” has triggered a dramatic switch of Russian public opinion towards China as Russia’s ally in war, and against the US and European states who are blamed for causing the war.
At the present time, as the Russian media are reporting President Trump’s pressure on President Putin to accept US terms for a peace deal, the Russian “party of war”, according to Volkov, numbers less than a majority. “Only about 40% of Russians can be considered the conditional ‘party of war’ (the average figure for over for all measurements — in the last few months this figure has decreased slightly), which insists that ‘it is necessary to continue military action.’ At the same time, the most consistent pro-military position is demonstrated by half the number of people – only about 20%-25% of Russians (depending on the wording of the issue, these figures are also quite stable) – those who all this time answer that ‘the ceasefire is now unacceptable under any circumstances’” and ‘definitely we should continue military operations.’ These are first of all, older men, and followers and supporters of the government. Their main arguments, responding in focus groups in the answers to open questions, are usually as follows: ‘it is necessary to finish what you started’, ‘it is necessary to go to the end, otherwise for what were all these victims’, ‘we need only victory’, ‘we cannot allow the enemy to regroup’, ‘we should negotiate with no one’ ”.
According to several poll measurements since 2022, “the so-called right opposition – people who advocate continuation of hostilities and at the same time do not support the authorities, the personification of which was Igor Strelkov (Girkin) — is almost indistinguishable in the polls. This position can be vividly represented in the military telegram channels, but, judging by the polls, it is shared by no more than 5% of Russians.”
If these hawks are in a minority from a base of 5% to no more than 25%, so are the doves, according to the Levada polling. “Throughout the conflict, the share of Russians who openly do not support the actions of the Russian military was on average about 18%-20%…Inside this group there are also people with ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ attitudes which differ from each other in their political views and a common understanding of the situation. Thus, the ‘strong’, uncompromising anti-war position is characteristic of 8% to 9% of Russians – these are people with the most consistent and well-designed anti-war beliefs. Often it is this position that is associated with tough anti-Putin views, sympathies to Ukraine and the West. Their main source of information is the Internet and video blogs. The remaining 9%-10% of Russians show rather a weak, less consistent disagreement with the position of the Russian authorities on Ukraine, which is not necessarily accompanied by pro-Ukrainian and pro-Western sympathies. This position is characteristic of the youngest Russians.”
Volkov has also reported on the sensitive issue of how Russian public is responding to the casualties of the war. “The intensity of hostilities and their duration suggest that the losses are serious. At the same time, no mass protest movement in Russia is observed…It is possible to explain the lack of resonance by the fact that the protest is not allowed to unfold, actions are dispersed, and people are afraid to take part in them, the information space is controlled, the criticism is forced into alternative media and marked by the dominant state media as a point of view of the enemy. All these explanations are fair, but it’s not just about that…”
“In focus groups, the topic of the number of losses arises from time to time, especially if there are those among the participants who have lost a relative or acquaintance. In this case, people usually share a personal experience, usually without criticism of the authorities. The lack of open protest may reflect the restraint stemming from multimillion-rouble payments to the families of those killed in special operations, the benefits for their children – all this should be especially significant for families in the Russian hinterland. In most cases, military operations do not directly affect the participants of focus groups, and therefore they can talk about the number of deaths rather detachedly. For most, these losses occur to someone else. The representation of people in the battles in Ukraine involves mainly professional soldiers and volunteers. Which means it’s their job, their choice, they knew what they were going to do.”
The Russian military bloggers do not publish data on Russian casualties, although they acknowledge that battlefield losses are occurring frequently, sometimes severely. The anti-Russian propaganda agencies Mediazona and BBC have been estimating Russian casualties from what they say is “a named list of deceased Russian military personnel. This list is compiled from verified, publicly available sources, including social media posts by family members, local news reports, and official announcements from regional authorities.”
These figures are considered by Russian and other military sources to be more credible than the figures announced by the Kiev regime, by Trump, his officials and the mainstream US media.
Source: https://en.zona.media/article/2025/04/25/casualties_eng-trl
In a report published last December by the Levada Centre, the dramatic switch of Russian public opinion from pro-American to anti-American, and correspondingly from anti to pro-Chinese was illustrated. “The contours of the current social attitude towards China were finally formed ten years ago against the backdrop of the conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine. An important symbolic event was the presence of Xi Jinping at the parade in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in Moscow in May 2015, while Western leaders refused to come demonstratively. The participation of the Chinese leader allowed us to say: “If China is with us, it will not be possible to isolate Russia.”
“As a result, in 2014, the number of Russians perceiving China as a friendly country doubled from 20 to 40%, positive estimates rose from 55 to 77%. A similar dynamics was observed after February 2022: a positive attitude towards China reached a record 92%, the perception of the country as friendly – 65%. The positive attitude towards China prevails in all socio-demographic groups and at all ages. The youngest respondents and residents of the Far East are as positive as possible to him, where interaction between the countries is most active.”
“The reversal towards China is perceived as an important element of the policy of Vladimir Putin and therefore reproduces the attitude to the president himself. A similar thing is observed in relation to the United States, to which opposition-minded citizens are much better than supporters of the authorities. Today, China is largely perceived by Russian public opinion as a counterweight to the West, anti-America. This was clearly manifested in the mirror discrepancy between China and the United States, first in 2014-2015, and then in 2022-2024, when the difference between these indicators reached 74 percentage points. The ongoing conflict with the West maintains a positive image of China in Russia. But this may mean that as relations with the West normalize the value of Russian-Chinese relations and the general attractiveness of China in the eyes of Russians will decline.”
Source: https://www.levada.ru/2024/12/09/i-ne-drug-i-ne-vrag-a-kak/
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