

by John Helmer, Moscow
@bears_with
On December 17, 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed two treaties of non-aggression and mutual assured security to stop the US and NATO alliance’s road to war against Russia.
This was the draft pact with the US; this was the draft pact with NATO. This is how to read them.
When the treaty provisions were summarily dismissed without discussion by the Biden Administration of the time and its NATO allies, the Russian special military operation against the US and NATO in the Ukraine was inevitable. It began sixty-nine days later.
Article 4 of the proposed treaty with NATO appeared to require the alliance to withdraw its territorial reach eastwards towards Russia to its borders at the cutoff date of May 27, 1997. “The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties.”
This appeared to mean that Russia was insisting NATO withdraw to its borders of May 27, 1997. In practice, unless Moscow agreed in “exceptional cases”, this excluded the NATO members who have joined up since then — Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004); Albania and Croatia (2009); Montenegro (2017); and North Macedonia (2020).
Article 6 of the pact added the undertaking, as of the end of 2021: “All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.” Since then Finland joined NATO in 2022; Sweden followed in 2023.
The two draft treaties remain the Foreign Ministry’s, the General Staff’s, and President Vladimir Putin’s roadmap for the peace settlement with the US and NATO to follow the end-of-war armistice in the Ukraine. This has been repeated many times over.
On Monday this week, President Donald Trump and President Emmanuel Macron discussed a framework for what they called peace in Europe. This, they told the press, involved US military “backing” (Trump’s term) for a European “assurance force” (Macron’s term) deployed on Ukrainian territory in what the Russians are calling a demilitarized zone and the Europeans, a disengagement zone. Macron told Trump that British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer would confirm his backing when he meets Trump on Thursday.
The Financial Times, a Japanese-owned propaganda organ in London, attempted to change the meaning of the obvious. It reported a single anonymous “French official” to say “there was ‘no definitive agreement’ on the nature of US back-up in Ukraine given the discussions were at a preliminary stage.” The newspaper also recruited a retired French diplomat to add that Macron “did make progress on that front even if Trump remained quite elusive.”
Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the presence in these new Ukrainian zones of troops from the countries which have fought Russia on the battlefield since 2022. But the Russians also say that a compromise may be negotiable between the Russian framework of December 17, 2021, and the present positions of the Russian Army advancing towards the Dnieper River and of the US and NATO war staffs retreating to Lvov and Rzeszów, in Poland.
An essay by Yevgeny Krutikov, published this week in Vzglyad, the Kremlin-funded security analysis platform, suggests senior officials at the Security Council believe in the possibility of arms withdrawal from the current battlefield and of military deconfliction with Russia – without attempting the impossible, the dismantling of the NATO membership to the 1997 cutoff.
At its simplest, this would mean the withdrawal of American troops, long-range missiles and nuclear ordnance (bombs, missile warheads, targeting systems) to the lines of 1997. This would leave in place NATO security guarantees for the post-1997 member states and their territories, combined with Russian non-aggression guarantees.
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